Although aviation accidents are rare, safety incidents occur more frequently and require careful analysis for providing actionable recommendations to improve safety. Automatically analyzing safety incidents using ight data is challenging because of the absence of labels on timestep-wise events in a ight, complexity of multidimensional data, and lack of scalable tools to perform analysis over large number of events. In this work, we propose a precursor mining algorithm that identi es correlated pa erns in multidimensional time series to explain an adverse event. Precursors are valuable to systems health and safety monitoring in explaining and forecasting anomalies. Current precursor mining methods su er from poor scalability to high dimensional time series data and in capturing long-term memory. We propose an approach by combining multiple-instance learning (MIL) and deep recurrent neural networks (DRNN) to take advantage of MIL's ability to model weakly-supervised data and DRNN's ability to model long term memory processes, to scale well to high dimensional data and to large volumes of data using GPU parallelism. We apply the proposed method to nd precursors and o er explanations to high speed exceedance safety incidents using commercial ight data.
INTRODUCTION
Explanations for Aviation safety incidents may be required for many reasons. A safety analyst working for a commercial airlines company may be interested in nding root causes of these incidents to improve the eet's safety, to do predictive maintenance, to monitor human factors such as fatigue, and situational awareness to improve pilot training etc. On the other hand, FAA and NASA who are directly monitoring airspace safety o en require such explanations to inform be er airspace designs, improve policies, regulations and standard operating procedures. Finally, event explanations may accelerate investigations about past safety incidents and accidents that are conducted by organizations such as the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).
Currently, safety incidents are explained manually; a group of human experts analyze a given safety incident and o er explanations using causal factors and correlated events that occurred in the ight. However, this is not a scalable approach with the numerous safety incidents that occur and with the growth in the volume of sensory data. e data recorded from short to medium range ights of a commercial passenger airline ying a narrow-body jet aircra includes on average about 900 exceedance incidents per day out of about 1000 ights that were operated 1 . It becomes impossible to manually analyze these events on a case-by-case basis to come up with actionable information to improve safety in a timely manner. is paper presents an automated way of using data mining to identify key correlated events in the data to explain a safety incident.
We propose using precursors as a means to identify key events in the ight time series data. A precursor is any correlated event that occurs prior to the safety incident with a high likelihood of the safety incident occurring in the future. Precursors give insights into the root causes of the failure and provide actionable insights with early alerts and corrective actions. To provide useful explanations, precursor mining aims to answer the following questions -"When do degraded states begin to appear?" "What are the degraded states?" "Are there corrective actions?" "What is the likelihood that the safety incident will occur?". For example, our method identi ed precursors to a particular high speed exceedance (safety incident) that was used to explain the incident as follows. During the landing phase of the ight (see Figure 1 ), about 25 miles away from the runway, most variables were normal indicating a "safe state." Correspondingly the probability of the safety incident was close to zero. At about 2500 altitude and 13 miles away, the ight made its turn to align with the runway when the speed reference was set incorrectly (unusually high) which caused the engine speed and consequentially the ight's speed to be high. Correspondingly the probability of the safety incident also increased. At about 8 miles out, the speed reference was corrected (reduced) which caused the airspeed to drop. is is indicated by a decreasing probability of failure indicating possible corrective actions. However, from about 1500 altitude, the likelihood increases because the aps were delayed. Flaps are friction surfaces that help reduce airspeed. In this case, aps are not set on time which caused the airspeed to remain high.
is happened so close to the checkpoint that the safety incident was agged. us, a 50 dimensional time series data from a ight was summarized to provide explanations about key events that occurred before the safety incident.
Precursor mining is a weakly-supervised learning problem. Usually we have easy access to a label that indicates the safety incident in a ight. e labels may come from aviation safety reporting system (ASRS) [25] where the ight crew volunteer to report safety incidents during their ight, or from exceedance reports that are automatically generated by using domain based rules to identify safety incidents. While a ight-level label is available, the labels for precursors within a ight are usually not available, which makes the explanation task challenging. To address this, our past work Figure 1 : Explanations in the form of key events identi ed by precursor mining algorithm for a ight that had a high speed exceedance (safety incident). Important events are shown by blue arrows, precursors are marked with red circles while a green star is used to indicate the safety incident.
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focused on using the ight-level information as a weak supervision to obtain the underlying decision making behavior using inverse reinforcement learning [16] . In this paper, we propose to use another weakly supervised learning approach called Multiple-Instance Learning (MIL) to use the ight-level label to infer timestep wise event labels.
A MIL se ing typically assumes a set of data instances grouped in the form of bags. e bag level labels are known while the instance labels are unknown. e task of MIL is to learn a model to either predict the bag labels or instance labels or both. An assumption is usually made in MIL that relates the instance-level labels to the bag-level labels. A standard assumption of MIL states that the bag is labeled positive if there is at-least one positive instance in the bag while it is labeled negative if all instances in the bag are negative. A more detailed discussion on MIL and the assumptions involved can be found in [4, 11, 12] . e standard MIL formulation does not consider time connection between instances and its performance drops when applied to time series data [13] such as the ight data considered in this work. To address this, we propose a deep temporal multiple-instance learning (DT-MIL) that extends the MIL framework to be applied to time series data. Further, by having deep neural network models, the approach can be scaled be er for large data sets using GPU parallelism. e main contributions of the paper include (1) a novel deep temporal multiple-instance learning (DT-MIL) framework that combines multiple-instance learning with deep recurrent neural networks suitable for weaklysupervised learning problems involving time series or sequential data.
(2) a novel way to explain safety incidents using automatically mined precursors from data. (3) detailed experiments, analysis and precursor insights using real-world aviation data. e rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss related work in Section 2. In Section 3, the precursor mining problem is formulated with an intuition about our approach followed by description of our DT-MIL model. e discussion about data, the considered safety incident and experiments are in Section 4. In Section 5, we present quantitative results of the DT-MIL method and discuss the explanations o ered for a few representative ights. We then summarize the work and conclude in Section 6.
LITERATURE REVIEW
e application of data mining and machine learning methods for aviation safety is not new. NASA Ames Research Center has been pioneering this line of work for several years and has developed methods such as Orca [6] , i-Orca [7] , Inductive Monitoring System [15] , Multiple Kernel Anomaly Detection (MKAD) [9] , ELM based anomaly detection [18] , among others. For event detection and optimal alarm systems, NASA has open-sourced the Adverse Condition and Critical Event Prediction Toolbox (ACCEPT) which is a suite of machine learning algorithms [22] . Outside of NASA, much of the work revolves around nding anomalies in ight data [21, 26] or in text reports [3, 28] . Another related research is in understanding human factors in ight safety [20] . e above work aims at detecting unsafe pa erns but o ers li le or no automated explanations.
Recently, several approaches for precursor mining have been proposed. e Automatic Discovery of Precursors in Time Series (ADOPT) nds precursors using multidimensional sensory time series data and has been applied to single ight incidents such as a take-o stall risk [17] , as well as to incidents such as go-around [16] that involve interactions between multiple ights. Another approach is using a nested multiple-instance learning that nds precursors to protests and social events using text data [23] . Other story telling based algorithms exist, for instance [14] , that are aimed at entity networks and using text documents but it is not trivial to see its applicability for multidimensional sensory data. Compared to the above methods, our approach combines multiple-instance learning (MIL) and deep recurrent neural networks (DRNN) to take advantage of MIL's ability to model weakly-supervised data and DRNN's ability to model long term memory processes, to scale well to high dimensional data and to large volumes of data using GPU parallelism.
Multiple-instance learning was rst proposed by Die erich et al. [11] which was then extended using support vector machines [4] and neural networks [24] . ere exists some work on using multiple instance learning for temporal data such as using autoregressive hidden Markov models [13] , and using recurrent neural networks [10] mainly to learn a prototype vector using the instances which is then used in the recurrent network for supervised classi cation of the bags. e motivation of this paper appears to be di erent from ours and it does not take advantage of the superior capabilities of long-term memory units such as the LSTM units. Only recently, deep multiple-instance learning has been proposed and used in the context of object detection and annotations [5, 27, 29] . Our work is an extension to the prior literature by combining multiple-instance learning with deep recurrent neural networks.
METHODOLOGY
In this section, we add more formalism to the precursor mining problem extending our earlier work [16] , discuss the idea behind using multiple-instance learning and introduce the deep temporal multiple-instance learning (DT-MIL) framework for this problem.
Precursor Mining Problem
e problem of precursor mining can be stated as follows. Let the time series data be represented by X with dimensions (N , L, d), where N denotes the number of time series records, L the maximum length of time series and d the number of sensory variables. Let an instance in record i at time t be given by
where f (.) is some function that captures a compressed representation of the sequence x i 1 , x i 2 , ..., x i t . Given the data X i and the corresponding safety incident label Y i , the goal of precursor mining is to nd a set of time instances {j}, 1 ≤ j ≤ L for which
Note that the labels are binary; i.e., Y i = 1 implies a safety incident reported in X i . e label is also for the entire ight X i which is a collection of instances e i 1 , e i 2 , .., e i t , .., e i L . Each x i t is a vector of d sensory variables such as airspeed, altitude, engine states, pilot switch positions, autopilot modes etc.
Intuition
Following the de nition from above, the task of precursor mining is a weakly-supervised task. e only supervision comes from the summary label for a ight that says if it had a safety incident or not. Using this high-level information, the goal is to identify low-level events that occurred during the ight that correlate to the safety incident. Multiple-instance learning is a natural t for weakly supervised problems where the bag labels (high-level supervision) are used to infer the instance labels (low-level). Further, a ight spans a nite time and events that happen during a ight are correlated temporally. For example, a ight typically involves dynamics at multiple time scales. An increase in thro le causes a response in engine speed in the order of milliseconds while it takes about 7-10 seconds to cause a notable increase in the airspeed of the ight. Also, when there is a change in wind condition or tra c pa ern, it takes much longer to see its e ect re ected in the ight's behavior.
us it is important to consider instances in the ight along with a context history (seen in the de nition of an instance e i t ). Figure  2 shows our proposed idea in which each ight is a multidimensional time series with a bag-level label that indicates if the ight had a safety incident or not. Here the instances are de ned as the sequence of measurements up to the current time. In this way, an instance at time t can be thought of as the event that occurs at time t, given the context up to time t. e standard MIL formulation does not capture temporal connection between data instances [13] , and we propose a MIL framework that address this problem in the next section.
e DT-MIL Model
In this section, we develop the deep temporal multiple-instance learning model for precursor mining. Earlier, we de ned the timeconnected instances e i t by using a history of data measurements. To e ciently model the instances, we use recurrent neural networks with a recently developed sophisticated recurrent unit called the gated recurrent unit (GRU) [8] . Motivated by long short-term memory (LSTM) units, GRUs are proposed as a variant to simplify computation and implementation. Compared to LSTM which has a memory cell and four gating units that adaptively control the information ow inside the unit, the GRU has only two gating units [8] . Owing to its simplicity over LSTM units, we choose GRU as the recurrent units for our model. e information ow in a GRU is shown in Figure 3 while its governing equations are shown below
e parameters of GRU include W r ,W z and W . e reset signal r t determines if the previous hidden state should be ignored while the update signal z t determines if the hidden state h t should be updated with the new hidden stateh t . By having many units each having its own reset and update signals, the GRU learns to capture the dependencies from past data over di erent time scales [8] .
e DT-MIL architecture is shown in Figure 4 . e time series data is processed by GRU units which convert the sequence of data into hidden states that are passed on to a layer of fully connected tanh units. e recurrent layer captures the temporal dependencies in the data while the fully connected layer adds more approximation capability to the model. Additional recurrent and fully connected layers may be added depending on the requirements.
is combination of recurrent and fully connected layers model the deep representation function f (.) in the instance de nition in equation (1) . e instances e t are obtained a er the fully connected layers which are then fed into a logistic layer to convert the instances into probabilities p 1 , p 2 , .., p t , .., p L . e MIL aggregation function a(.) converts the instance probabilities into a bag probabilityˆ aŝ i = a(p i 1 , p i 2 , .., p i t , .., p i L ).
e loss function for learning is a binary cross-entropy function given by where represents the bag label. e above setup can be easily extended to a multi-class case by having many independent logistic layers followed by MIL aggregation layers for each class. It must be noted that multiple logistic layers may be be er suited compared to a so -max layer because a ight may have multiple safety incidents that may not be independent of each other. e model can then be trained using standard backpropagation taking advantage of all the recent advancements made in deep learning including GPU parallelism. e MIL aggregation is an important function that mimics the MIL assumptions under the cross-entropy loss function. For example, if a(.) is set to a max(.), then it mimics the standard MIL assumption. To see how this works, let the true bag label be 0. To minimize the loss,ˆ will be pushed close to 0. Givenˆ i = max(p i 1 , p i 2 , .., p i t , .., p i L ) and whenˆ is made small, the instance probabilities p i 1 , p i 2 , .., p i t , .., p i L are all pushed close to 0 simultaneously. On the other hand, when the true bag label is a 1, then with the aggregation function being a max(.), at least one of the instance probabilities will be pushed close to 1. Other aggregation functions such as mean, weighted mean, approximated max may be used to re ect di erent MIL behavior and assumptions.
EXPERIMENTS 4.1 Data
For this study, we use the Flight Operational ality Assurance (FOQA) data provided by a de-identi ed commercial airline 2 operated between April 2010 to October 2011. Figure 5 shows the airports in Europe where the de-identi ed airlines operate. e FOQA data consists of most of the sensory measurements on board the aircra including ight speed, altitude, ight control surfaces, thrust, engine power, fuel consumption, pilot switches, pitch, roll, pressure, temperature among many others. e data is sampled at 1 Hz. Most of the data used in this work are recorded from ights that takeo from these airports. To eliminate variability in aircra characteristics, we consider only the Airbus models A319 and A320 because they belong to the same weight category of interest in this work.
Safety Incident
Accident statistics [2] show that about half of the fatal accidents happen during the last 4% of the ight -the nal approach and landing. One of the key causes of landing related accidents involve energy mismanagement [1] , which o en lead to loss of control, landing before reaching the runway, runway overrun, hard landing, tail strike etc. e aircra energy is a function of the weight, airspeed, altitude, thrust, li and drag forces. One of the primary tasks of the crew is to monitor and control the aircra 's energy using the thro le, ight path, friction surfaces such as aps, slats, speed brakes among others.
In this work, we consider the high-speed exceedance (HSE) during landing as the safety incident. e HSE is a rule-based de nition for a safety incident that is widely used in operations to analyze safety. HSE is de ned as airspeed [al t itude=1000f t ] > target + tolerance (9) where airspeed and target are recorded as part of the FOQA data. If equation (9) is satis ed, the ight is labeled positive as having the HSE safety event. e label may come from the ASRS reports or from other sources as well. Note that the DT-MIL setup does not require the timestep location of the safety incident. As long as the safety incident is known to have occurred during the ight, it can be labeled positive.
Model Setup
From our FOQA data, we selected a subset of sensory variables for this study, excluding the ones that were clearly not useful for explaining the HSE event. Some of the continuous variables include airspeed, altitude, angle of a ack, speed target, speed reference, aileron position, elevator position, rudder position, stabilizer position, engine speed, pitch angle, roll angle, accelerations along the 3 axes, vertical speed, aircra gross weight. Some categorical variables include commands on aps, speed brakes, landing gear, activations of autopilot, autothro le and various modes of the autopilot, ight director and ight such as ight director engage status, location capture, altitude modes, thrust N1 mode, thrust EPR mode, vertical speed mode, TCAS and STALL status etc [17] . e FOQA data includes over 300 sensory variables out of which we chose a subset of 60 variables based on both domain knowledge and automated feature selection using Granger causality [17] .
In about 15 months of operational data, we had about 500 ights that had the HSE event. We sampled the same number of nominal ights. We considered the approach and landing phases of the ight starting approximately 25 nautical miles away from the runway. We sampled the ight sensory data at every quarter nautical mile of ground distance own until touchdown. us, each ight record is about 100 time steps long. Note that the DT-MIL algorithm does not require the time series records to have the same lengths but this was easy to achieve for the current problem. We split the data randomly into training, validation and testing data in proportions 0.5, 0.3, 0.2 respectively. e HSE event is de ned based on airspeed and if we choose airspeed as one of the features, then it is possible to get a trivial explanation such as a high airspeed leads to the speed exceedance. To avoid this, we ignored the airspeed and other variables that were highly correlated with airspeed such as ground speed. e data was normalized to center around the mean and have unit variance.
e DT-MIL model was prototyped using Tensor ow. e DT-MIL model architecture is shown in Fig 4. It includes a GRU recurrent layer with 20 units, a fully connected tanh layer with 500 units, and a logistic layer to output the instance probabilities. A max(.) MIL aggregation layer was used to mimic the standard MIL assumption. e model was trained using one GPU on a Dell Precision workstation with 64GB of RAM. e ADAM [19] optimizer with a learning rate of 0.002 was used. An L 2 regularization with coecient 0.0005 was used for all model parameters. e best model was identi ed by monitoring the performance on the validation data. 5.1 antitative Results e models were evaluated using area under the receiver operating characteristic (AUC) score. e DT-MIL model was able to achieve a high accuracy in predicting the HSE event (see Table 1 for bag-level AUC obtained on training and unseen testing data). 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Instance Probabilities
Using the instance probabilities, the signi cant events that explain the HSE incident may be identi ed. Figure 6 shows the instance probabilities for nominal ights and ights with the HSE event for the unseen test data. It can be seen that most of the ights (in both sub gures) start the approach and landing phases from a relatively "safe" state with probabilities close to zero, which is what one would expect. Instances that are about 25 nautical miles from touchdown may be too far out to show signi cant indications about the HSE incident. As the ights approach the 1000 altitude instant where the HSE event is checked, the instance probabilities increase close to 1 (100% likelihood of HSE occurring) for the ights with HSE event (in red), indicating that the instances have information correlating to the HSE event. Such events may be considered as precursors in the explanation task. On the other hand, for the nominal ights (in green), the instance probabilities remain close to zero most of the times, indicating absence of precursors in majority. With the choice of a max(.) function for the MIL aggregation, if the instance probability goes above 0.5 at any time during the ight, it will be considered a positive ight. is happens for a few nominal ights which accounts for the false positives. e instances that have a high probability indicate possible precursors even in nominal ights. However, for nominal ights, such precursors are usually followed by corrective actions which decrease the probability close to zero before the HSE checkpoint at 1000 altitude. is is the case for most nominal ights except for two ights that have a probability higher than 0.5 at the 1000 altitude checkpoint. In the next section, we explain the HSE events using the precursors and corrective actions inferred from the instance probabilities.
Safety Incident Explanation
Using DT-MIL, we analyze two ights that had the HSE incident and one nominal ight that was wrongly classi ed as a HSE ight (false positive). Figure 7 shows a ight that had the HSE incident. In this ight, up to an altitude of 2700 (about 15 miles away from the runway), most variables are within nominal bounds indicating a "safe" state. A few minutes later, the ight made a turn to its nal leg. During this time, the usual trend is to reduce the engine command. However, the engine command was increased which caused the engine speed to be higher than normal leading to the ight's airspeed to remain higher than normal. Owing to the airspeed being high, the aps were not set. ese events are identi ed as precursors by DT-MIL with corresponding high probability scores.
is was corrected when the ight moved close to the outer-marker (5 miles out) which caused the airspeed to decrease, allowing the initial aps to be set. However, although the airspeed allowed further increase of aps, around 1500 , it was delayed for some unknown reason. us, the airspeed remained high at the checkpoint, causing the HSE event.
e corresponding probability of DT-MIL indicates this sequence of events. Figure 8 shows another HSE ight that was explained using DT-MIL precursors. is ight had an aggressive drop in altitude when the ight was between 15 and 10 nautical miles away from the runway. e ight did a roll maneuver along with a steep drop in altitude which caused the airspeed to remain high. Flying involves managing and trading o energy from potential (altitude) to kinetic (airspeed) forms. During landing, energy management is of extreme importance and if not done well, o en leads to safety incidents. e aggressive drop in altitude is the main precursor which is followed by a delayed se ing of the aps explains the HSE event for this ight.
To understand false alarms, a nominal ight that was predicted to be positive is analyzed. Figure 9 shows that until about 2000 altitude and 5 miles away from the runway, the ight variables were nominal. However, close to the checkpoint, the aps were not set. Flaps are friction surfaces that are used to control airspeed during landing. e previous examples also show that delaying aps is one of the main precursors to the HSE incident. In this ight, the aps were delayed but for some unknown reason (possibly winds, which are not captured in this data), the airspeed remains nominal in spite of the nal aps not set.
e DT-MIL model nds this high-risk precursor and gives a high probability value although the HSE event is not agged in this ight.
CONCLUSION
is paper introduces a precursor mining framework for explaining aviation safety incidents. e DT-MIL algorithm extends multiple instance learning to temporal data using deep recurrent neural nets as building blocks. e DT-MIL algorithm is applied to a high speed exceedance safety incident using real ight recorded time series data to nd precursors and build an explanation for the adverse event. Future work will involve extending the DT-MIL framework to analyze multiple safety incidents and formulate ight safety margins using this method.
